This paper reviews the pattern of bank failures during the financial crisis and asks whether there was a link with corporate governance. It revisits the theory of bank governance and suggests a multiconstituency approach that emphasizes the role of weak creditors. The empirical evidence suggests that on average banks with stronger risk officers, less independent boards and executives with less variable remuneration incurred fewer losses. There is no evidence that institutional shareholders opposed aggressive risk taking. The Financial Stability Board published Principles for Sound Compensation Practices in 2009; the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued Principles for enhancing corporate governance in 1999, 2006 and 2010. Shareholders retain residual control and executive pay continues to be aligned with shareholder interests. Bank governance is different and requires more radical departures from the traditional corporate form.
Introduction
The international corporate governance discussion is mostly concerned with weak shareholders and dominant executives in the United States, insufficiently engaged shareholders in the United Kingdom and powerful but conflicted blockholders in most other countries. The traditional conflict between shareholders, managers and boards is also present in banks. Many banks, and most of the largest banks, are limited liability stock corporations. Like any other type of corporation they can be afflicted by board failure on strategy and oversight, misaligned or perverse incentives, empire building, conflicts of interest, weaknesses in internal controls, incompetence and fraud.
Banks also have specific governance issues. The very nature of the banking business weakens the traditional corporate governance institutions of board and shareholder oversight. Banks have the ability to take on risk very quickly, without being immediately visible to directors or outside investors. A multitude of quickly evolving and technically complex activities need to be monitored by specialists who are in short supply. In widely held banks, shareholder oversight is exercised by conflicted financial institutions, expensive, and/or carried out by insufficiently qualified personnel. Regulation and valuation difficulties weaken the potential role of the market for corporate control. In blockholder controlled banks, including state controlled institutions, lending is easily steered to favourite blockholder projects. Banks are heavily regulated, but they also have strong political influence, fostered by revolving-door appointments and substantial donations to political parties.
Banks are multi-constituency organisations. Depositors and bondholders contribute almost all of a bank's capital, yet most decisions are taken by managers, boards and shareholders. Bank executives do not have to seek permission from depositors before changing a bank's risk profile. Depositors can "run", but in most countries they are indifferent to the bank's financial prospects because they are protected by deposit insurance or a state guarantee. During the financial crisis this guarantee was extended to bondholders and other creditors, who had refused to roll over their loans. The largest, most complex and most difficult to govern institutions are covered by an implicit "too big to fail" guarantee. What should be the role of unprotected creditors, deposit insurers and the state -as the ultimate provider of guarantees for protected creditors -in bank governance? Is bank regulation a complement or a substitute for corporate governance?
Empirically it has been difficult to establish a link between bank failures and corporate governance: partly because government rescues have masked the true extent of the problems, and partly because so many factors have contributed. Even so, recent empirical research on corporate governance and the crisis confirms that bank governance is different. There is powerful evidence of executive remuneration induced risk-shifting at U.S. investment banks, commercial banks and insurance companies. Risk-taking at these institutions is highly correlated with short-term cash payouts in the form of base pay, bonuses, share and option sales. The relationship is robust to variations in the degree of executive-shareholder interest alignment, as measured by insider ownership. It is also robust to a series of corporate governance measures, like board independence or how well the bank was shielded from the market for corporate control. The latest evidence also suggests that losses at banks with "tougher boards", boards that were more independent of the senior executives, were larger. There is, so far, no direct evidence that shareholders insisted on more risk taking, but there is no evidence that they opposed it either.
The latest Basel Principles for enhancing corporate governance recognize that boards and executives have a responsibility to creditors and not just to shareholders but do not change the fundamental power structure in banks; shareholders continue to appoint and remove directors. To make the new accountability effective it might be necessary to experiment with deeper reforms, for example the idea of having creditors represented on the boards, either directly or through a representative agent, like the deposit insurance fund. This type of representation would also facilitate the operation of bail-ins and other types of resolution requiring debt to equity swaps at very short notice. The board member would not have to be an employee of the deposit insurer, but could be nominated by the fund.
The current proposals on remuneration reform have similar shortcomings. Remuneration reform at banks was a G20 decision and Financial Stability Board (FSB) has published implementation standards. The emphasis is on aligning remuneration more closely with risk taking. Again, these reforms move in the right direction, but there are substantial implementation problems. Banks are allowed to develop their own policies and will make their own risk adjustments. It is doubtful that supervisors will have the competence or resources to monitor these developments. Simple rules might be preferable to idiosyncratic complexity. Section 2 looks back at financial institutions that failed during the crisis and explores if there is any obvious correlation with organizational form or specific corporate governance characteristics of these firms. Section 3 reviews why bank governance differs from the governance of non-financial institutions. Section 4 reviews the existing empirical evidence, particularly on executive compensation and boards. Section 5 reviews the main reform proposals. Section 6 concludes.
Bank Failures During the Financial Crisis
The financial crisis first manifested itself in early 2007. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis marks the beginning of the crisis with the filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection by the New Century Financial Corporation and an announcement by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) that it would no longer buy the most risky subprime mortgages (27 February 2007) . CNN sets the initial marker to 7 February 2007, when HSBC announced substantial losses linked to the U.S. subprime market. A string of failures in the United States and Europe followed, including the nationalisation of Northern Rock in the United Kingdom, the bailout of Bear Stearns by the U.S. Federal Reserve, the bankruptcy of Countrywide Financial in California and the government rescues of IKB in Germany and Roskilde Bank in Denmark. Events accelerated in September 2008 with the U.S. government taking Freddie Mac and its sister government-sponsored enterprise, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), into "conservatorship" and Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy. Banks started failing on a daily basis and there was widespread panic in equity and credit markets.
The authorities on both sides of the Atlantic reacted by launching unprecedented assistance programmes. In the U.S. the Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP) made direct investments totalling $204.7 billion in 739 banks. These investments went to the largest troubled banks to prevent them from failing and to the strongest smaller banks to prop up their capital and stimulate lending. The Federal government also assisted credit unions ($57bn), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ($110.6bn). The largest single recipients of aid were the American International Group (AIG, $127.4bn), Citibank ($50bn) and Bank of America ($35bn). Despite these efforts the total number of failures among FDIC insured banks from 2007 to October 2010 was 295, at a cost to the deposit insurance fund of $45.4bn (Table 1) .
In Europe most Member States provided general guarantees for the whole banking system as well as support for the weakest banks, through capital injections, guarantees on bank liabilities, impaired asset relief and funding support. State aid to the banking system in each Member State had to be notified to and approved by the European Commission's Directorate General for Competition. Most schemes were approved but often tied to corporate restructuring requirements or other conditions. In contrast to TARP, most of the aid did not take the form of capital injections (capital purchases), but guarantees. The general view was that banks were not insolvent but merely suffering from a liquidity crisis. The hope was that the guarantees and other liquidity supporting measures would ensure that the guarantees would never result in actual losses for the state.
In the case of Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom the total effective aid granted by July 2009 exceeded 20% of GDP and in the case of Ireland 229% (Table 2 ). In 2010 it became evident that the largest Irish banks were not suffering a liquidity crisis but were actually insolvent. Their recapitalisation and guarantee related losses caused a sovereign debt crisis, resulting in a bailout from the European Union and the IMF. The Irish banks had previously passed European Union wide stress tests, casting serious doubts on the methodology employed, as well as the resolution procedures employed.
According to the European Commission's data, relatively few banks had received specific assistance between the beginning of the crisis and the end of October 2010, with the largest number of aid cases reported from Germany, followed by the U.K., Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands (Table 3) . 1 Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia did not implement any assistance programmes.
The crisis resolution mechanisms in the United States and the European Union proved to be inadequate. In the United States the FDIC handled smaller bank failures, including the sale of the Washington Mutual to JP Morgan efficiently and effectively. However, the FDIC was unable (or not allowed) to deal with the largest cases, like Citibank. The insurance giant AIG was outside the FDIC's competence, as well as the shadow banking sector. In Europe many Member States found themselves incapable of implementing swift resolution. Shareholders in the otherwise bankrupt Fortis Holding and Hypo Real Estate took the Belgian and the German governments to court, arguing that their rights had been violated during the rescues. The Icelandic case revealed the subtle difference between subsidiaries and branches. The Lehman Brothers creditors and staff in London were surprised to learn that all cash balances in London had been transferred to New York the night before the Chapter 11 filing. The U.K. was fortunate to have updated its legal toolbox after the run on Northern Rock. Regulation and bank governance had not kept up with the growing integration of the European and the transatlantic financial system. The attitude of governments towards the banks the state invested in was similar across countries. The equity holdings were administered by a variety of vehicles that were either in existence for other purposes (in Belgium) or specially created (in Denmark, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S.). The equity investments were regarded as passive and the governments refused to get involved in the governance of the individual banks as a majority shareholder, with the exception of general restrictions on remuneration and payout policies imposed during the recapitalisation. The role of the government, or bondholders after a bail-in, as an equity holder in a rescued bank is an important issue but beyond the scope of this paper.
Is there a link between bank governance, leverage, risk taking and bank failure? The empirical answer is not self-evident. The list of institutions that failed, or only survived because they received assistance from the state, is heterogeneous. It involves real estate investment trusts, insurance companies, savings banks, commercial banks, investment banks and banking conglomerates. Most failed institutions were organised as stock corporations, but some were mutual banks or credit unions. Most stock corporations were widely held, but some had large outside shareholders. In the European case, many of the failed institutions were owned and/or controlled by the state. In some countries almost the entire banking sector collapsed, in other countries (Canada is a notable example) no banks failed at all.
The sources of loss and the reasons for failure also vary across countries and institutions. Among the worst affected were those that participated directly in the origination and/or distribution of asset backed securities and derivative products, but were unable or unwilling to offload their positions on time. Banks that invested heavily in these securities also suffered; these included the U.S. credit unions and many of the European ("sucker") banks. Several banks had made or were in the process of making corporate acquisitions, at what turned out to be disastrously high prices. Northern Rock in the U.K. had expanded aggressively by reducing staff in branches and taking deposits through the internet. In an uncertain environment a computer problem on the weekend and the photo of a queue outside an understaffed branch caused a bank run. Regular mortgage lenders in Denmark, Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States were badly affected by the local fall in house prices. Many institutions were simply caught in the general liquidity squeeze and the oncoming recession. Most failures were due to a combination of factors.
What is Different about Bank Governance
The nature of banks' activities present unique challenges that need to be addressed by their governance mechanisms. This section explores some of the specificities of financial intermediation and their implications for corporate governance.
A crucial function performed by commercial banks -and, increasingly in recent years, by the shadow banking sector as well -is maturity transformation: using the very liquid demand deposits desired by investors to invest in risky, illiquid projects with a distant payoff horizon by providing long term loans or equity investments. The role played by the banks in this process involves (i) reducing risk by putting together a diversified loan and investment portfolio, and (ii) bearing the cost of generating the information needed to select and monitor the projects in which money is invested. As formalized in the seminal analysis of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , the maturity mismatch leaves banks open to liquidity risk in the form of bank runs: even when the bank's underlying business is fundamentally sound, mass withdrawal of short-term funding may necessitate premature liquidation of long term investment projects. Deposit insurance is a means to discourage such concerted withdrawals of deposits and short-term funding from banks that would otherwise be solvent.
This begs the question of why financial intermediaries do not use more long-term funding to mitigate the maturity mismatch problem. The root cause of the problem lies in the very nature of the business, which is fast moving, risky and opaque, so that it is very difficult to ensure through bond covenants or other means of monitoring that creditors' money is not put at undue risk. Banks are in the business of taking risks; they can take on risk quickly and easily; they can mask, to some extent, how much risk they take. Their portfolios are often illiquid and hard-to-value, their positions shift rapidly and their assets and liabilities can be extremely complex. This compromises the availability of long-term funding, be it debt or equity.
Long-run debt is much less commonly used to fund operations than short-run debt, due to the opacity and riskiness of the business. Shareholder-creditor conflicts are potentially important and risk shifting in particular is a major concern, especially in bad times when the going-concern value of the bank is low and its management is tempted to "gamble for resurrection" by investing in heads-I-win-tailsyou-lose bets that provide upside potential for the owners while exposing creditors to the downside. Normally short-term funding curtails risk shifting because funding quickly dries up when a financial institution reaches this point. But with government deposit insurance, this disciplinary effect is absent and needs to be replaced by regulatory monitoring and intervention; a hard-won lesson from the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s, when troubled S&Ls (due to maturity mismatch: interest rates required to attract depositors rose dramatically in the 1980s, while the interest on their outstanding loan book did not rise in step) gambled heavily by investing in junk bonds, which hugely increased the ultimate cost to taxpayers. Capital requirements for FDIC-insured institutions were tightened considerably in the wake of that crisis but attention to the problem waned over time (Morgenson and Rosner, 2011) .
Outside equity financing is also vulnerable to agency problems because of the opaque nature of the business which makes it difficult to distinguish profitable business from that which generates shortterm gains at the expense of an unacceptable long-term downside. Thus, in particular in investment banking, inside equity has traditionally been the norm, with the equity supplied by the partners who make the main decisions. In recent years, however, a growing number of investment banks have sought equity from outside investors and converted to publicly listed firms. Even so, banks tend to minimize the amount of equity capital tied up in their business. The tax advantages of debt finance and the effective government subsidy to the use of debt -both via explicit deposit insurance and in the form of less clearly delineated implicit guarantees -are added reasons for firms to economize on equity capital even in normal times. In bad times, shareholder-bondholder conflicts mean that firms will not or cannot obtain equity capital altogether -a problem known as debt overhang. For example, at the helm at Lehman Bros., Dick Fuld had ample opportunity to raise additional equity in the year before its demise, but "dithered", effectively choosing not to. In Appendix 2 we provide an example of debt overhang that illustrates how a firm that approaches insolvency will be unwilling to shore up its capital, and, if the situation worsens any further, unable to do so.
Compensation in Banks
There are important theoretical caveats to the standard model when applied to the financial services industry. The first caveat is the absence of leverage. The standard theory refers to an all-equity firm with no debtholders, a feature it shares with most other compensation theories that are normally discussed in corporate governance. Banks are highly leveraged organisations. When managers are rewarded with stock grants they have a conflict of interest with debtholders, just like any other bank shareholders. The fear of loss of human capital or reputation might make managers less inclined to take risks than ordinary shareholders. The combination of leverage with the other caveats discussed below make it more likely though that bank executives have an incentive to take more risks than desired by shareholder or debtholders.
The second caveat is the absence of endogenous choice of risk or volatility of earnings. There is no link between incentives and risk-taking, a central feature of a reward model for banks. The third caveat the discrepancy between the stock grants in the model and bank remuneration practice. In the run-up to the crisis the bulk of variable compensation was made composted of stock-options and/or cash bonuses.
The fourth caveat is the assumption of market completeness. Investors are assumed to be risk neutral so there is no scope for asset bubbles. House price bubbles have been a major feature of the crisis in the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Denmark and some parts of Eastern Europe. A policy relevant theory of pay in banks should therefore allow for bubbles. Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) introduced a model of financial markets that relies on the idea that investors have fundamentally different sets of opinion making them disagree about the fundamental value of a company, or another type of asset. Bubbles can develop because optimists will buy stocks and the short sales constraint will prevent the pessimists from betting against that stock. The stock (or house, or mortgage backed security) is held most often by optimists. The bubble is generated by the idea that an optimist hopes to be able to sell to someone who is even more optimistic than him-or herself. Investors do not look at fundamental value but at how opinions evolve over time taking into account what other investors will think in the future. The bubble bursts when the most optimistic optimists are unable to find a buyer.
Allowing for the endogenous choice of volatility or risk and putting together bubbles with volatility choice easily generates incentives towards excess risk-taking, even for an all equity firm. Investors try to maximise the fundamental value of the firm, but they also want to maximise the speculative option value, the option to be able to sell to a more optimistic investor. Since option value is strictly increasing with volatility shareholders and managers owning shares have an incentive to increase volatility.
Rewarding Beta
The problem of rewarding bankers is similar to rewarding mutual fund managers. In the mutual fund literature, there has been a long time quest for rewarding alpha, not beta, the sensitivity of fund returns with respect to a relevant market. Mutual fund managers should not be awarded for market movements, but for their "contribution to alpha", the intrinsic performance of the fund. It is also understood that fund managers have career concerns.
In practice, bank CEOs are awarded with at the money options. These options are not indexed to any measure of a market portfolio, or some other benchmark. Without correcting for beta, very large and positive stock price returns might be purely driven by very high loading on beta. In a boom phase a high beta bank will, by definition, outperform the market. The CEO will have an incentive to increase the sensitivity of the bank's performance to the market, which is not very difficult. The CEO will be managing the bank for a relatively short period of time and will retire or vest his or her options, or stock, before the boom is over.
The situation is even worse with bonuses tied to absolute performance. Bonuses are pure cashpayouts. Restricted stock, or options that are convert to restricted stock, are a contribution to the bank's capital, at least during the time they cannot be sold. We now have solid empirical evidence that there was a strong link between total cash payouts for senior executives and risk taking at U.S. banks in the run-up to the crisis.
Are there alternative remuneration schemes that align executive incentives more effectively with creditors and deposit insurers? Bolton, Mehran and Shapiro (2010) develop a model that proposes to link executive compensation to leverage. In the model, the shareholders of a leveraged institution will provide CEOs with monetary incentives to take excessive risk. To avoid this problem, the authors propose to link executive pay to stock price performance, but a measure of default risk. In particular they propose to link to the CDS spread of the bank relative to the average CDS spread for a basket of banks. To the extent that the CDS spread deviates, being larger or smaller than the average, the CEO is rewarded or penalised.
Bank Governance is Different : The Evidence
Bank governance is different in theory. Is it also different in practice? We review the latest empirical studies that explorethe link between corporate governance characteristics of financial institutions and how they fared during the financial crisis. We look at the "usual suspects" in corporate governance: boards and ownership. We then turn of executive pay and internal control.
Boards
Post-Enron reforms in the United States imposed substantial changes on corporate boards. In 2003 the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq altered their listing rules requiring domestic U.S. issuers to appoint a majority of independent directors to the board and to establish audit, nominating and compensation committees composed entirely of independent directors. Companies had to put the new requirements in place no later than the end of October 2004. Outside the United States similar recommendations were made through corporate governance codes, but they were not binding. There were also recommendations to reduce board size and appoint directors with enough free time. The Basel recommendations on bank governance issued in 2006 endorsed these measures but also emphasised qualifications: "Board members should be qualified for their positions, have a clear understanding of their role in corporate governance and be able to exercise sound judgement about the affairs of the bank (Principle 1)". Basel also extended the concept of independence to mean independent from management and from large shareholders, including the state.
How did banks respond? A recent study of international bank boards (Ferreira, Kirchmaier, Metzger 2010) confirms that the average U.S. bank holding company boardbecame smaller, had more independent, less busy and somewhat less competent directors (Table 5 ). The U.S. banks always exceeded the NYSE independence requirement: The percentage of independent directors was already 51% in 2000 but increased further to 67% in 2007. The average board size decreased from 15 to 11.6 members. The average bank board outside the United States did not adopt the U.S. reforms. The number of independent directors was consistently smaller than 50%, boards were larger than in the U.S. and populated by directors with more outside appointments. However a larger percentage of directors had previous banking experience (36% compared to 18% in the United States in 2006).
Looking across countries board independence did not prevent failure in the U.S., the U.K. and Ireland, but did not prevent stability in Canada and India (Ferreira et. al. 2010, Table III) . Independence does correlate with losses at the bank level. Erkens, Hung and Matos (2010) regress stock performance and write-downs during the crisis on the percentage of independent directors across a heterogeneous sample of 296 banks.
2 Independence has a positive effect on losses, even when controlling for other factors, like institutional ownership. 3 Beltratti and Stulz (2011) only look at deposit taking banks.
They find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards, measured by aggregated scores for meeting minimum standards for "good-governance" attributes relating to board independence, composition of committees, size, transparency and conduct, as defined by Institutional Shareholder Services, fared distinctly worse during the crisis.The sample is more comparable across banks but small (98 large deposit takers), so country effects outside the U.S. are poorly identified.
Cross-country studies control imperfectly for interactions between board independence and local institutionspotentially biasing the results. Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2011) avoid this problem by studying a large sample of U.S. commercial banks (75%), savings and loans associations (~23%) and investment banks (2%) from 2003 to 2008. They confirm that board independence correlates positively with poor stock performance and decreases in market-to-book ratios during the crisis. However, for the pre-crisis period (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) board independence has an insignificant impact on risk-taking in large commercial banks. However, there is a strong positive relation with the percentage of independent financial experts on the board: "this result is [..] more generally consistent with a more financially knowledgeable board having a better understanding of more complex investments and potentially encouraging bank management to increase their risk taking" (pg. 24). 4 The reverse interpretation is equally plausible: banks that wanted to take more risk appointed independent directors with more financial expertise (Mehran, Morrison and Shapiro 2011) .
Evidence from Europe suggests that the boards of failed institutions did not understand what some employees of the bank were doing. In Germany and Spain board incompetence correlates very strongly with losses incurred during the crisis at state controlled Landesbanken (Hau and Thum 2009) and state or church dominated Cajas (Cuñat and Garicano 2010) . They seemingly contradict the U.S. findings.
The contradiction illustratesthe limitation of regression analysis in the formulation of policy recommendations, particularly across countries. The regression analysis from Germany is consistent with the latest interview"evidence": the underpaid and insufficiently qualified bankers at IKB and the Landesbanken were no match for highly motivated bond salesmen from London and New York (Lewis 2011) . However, forensic analysis by Ernst & Young into the demise of Sachsen LB on behalf of its owner, the Land, squarely blamed the management: the board had not been informed about the deteriorating situation of the bank's Irish conduits. Board members never had a chance to show their (in)competence. 5 In contrast, the board and the management New Century Financial appear to have acted quite deliberately. A number of directors and executives told the bankruptcy examiner that they did not focus "on whether borrowers could meet their obligations under the term of the mortgage", but "whether the loans New Century originated could be initially sold or securitized in the secondary market" (Missal 2008, pg. 4) .Board competence appears to be a requisite for avoiding Landesbanken 2 The sample is biased to the U.S. (125 banks); larger countries include Germany (19 banks), Italy (19), the U.K.
(17) and Switzerland (15). 3 The study reports more independence for non-U.S. boards than Ferreira Kirchmaier and Metzger (2010) . 4 Fernandes and Fich (2009) present contradictory evidence; they find that the likelihood of failure and/or of receiving bailout funds was smaller when bands had boards with more financial expertise. Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2011, pg. 6 ) conjecture that differences in variable definition and/or sample composition might explain the inconsistency. 5 Geinitz, Christian, "Gutachter kritisieren Vorstand scharf", FAZ.net, 11 March 2008
and Cajas type problems. Financially experienced boards must be given the right incentives to dissuade them from taking excessive risks.
Ownership and Control
Did concentrated shareholders encourage non-executive bank directors and managers to take on more riskand/or more leverage? We review the available evidence on institutional ownership, blockholders (including state ownership) and ownerless banks. There is one piece of convincing evidence that institutional shareholders did not oppose risk taking, but no direct evidence that they encouraged risk taking. Previous results suggesting that blockholder ownership outside the United States was associated with bank instability has been called into question by the crisis. (Table 7) . If there had been private dissent it is likely that institutional shareholders, given their embarrassment over the losses incurred, would have made these records public. We therefore conclude that institutional shareholders did not oppose risk taking at banks, but there is no direct evidence that they lobbied for it. What would have happened if bank boards had proposed pay packages linked to debt and not to equity remains a counterfactual.
Outside the United States banks are frequently controlled by blockholders. The blockholder is typically a family or the state and often appoints representatives to the board. Institutional ownership is not relevant unless the blockholder also favours more risk taking. The attitude to risk taking by blockholders is ambiguous (Section 3). A widely cited pre-crisis study found that the presence of a 10%+ blockholder correlates with more risk taking, as measured by Z-scores (Laeven and Levine 2009). The finding would suggest that countries with blockholder dominated banks fared worse in the crisis. This was not the case. Countries with particularly stable banks (high Z-scores) during the 1996-2001sample period were Ireland, the United Kingdom and Switzerland, three countries with widely held banks that collapsed during the crisis (LL 2009 Table A1 ).In contrast, many countries dominated by blockholder banks had low Z-scores and withstood the crisis very well, like Brazil, India and Korea.
There is a more recent cross-country study that includes the crisis period. Gropp and Köhler (2010) regress bank risk measured by the deviation of return on equity 2008from its average 2003-2006for a large number of listed and non-listed banks in OECD countries on various bank and country characteristics. They find a small positive effect of ownership concentration that is dominated by an "anti-director-rights index" country dummy that correlates very strongly with ownership dispersion; the net-effect suggests that losses were greater for widely held banks. The largest losses were incurred at (widely held) bank holding companies, but the losses at investment banks are reported as not significant. The latter result casts serious doubt on the accuracy of this dummy variable.
Government ownership of banks is controversial and a number of pre-crisis studies have argued that such ownership is associated with underdeveloped financial systems, instability and low growth. 6 Again, the crisis has contradicted this evidence, but not completely. In the OECD as a whole losses at state controlled bank were insignificant (Gropp and Köhler 2010). As we discussed in the board section, losses did occur in Belgium, Germany and Spain.
Theory predicts that "ownerless banks" like mutual or cooperative banks that are "owned" by depositors take fewer risks than corporate banks. This proposition found some support in the U.S. savings and loans crisis. Corporate savings banks took greater risks than savings banks that were organized as mutual companies. Casual inspection of the list of failed institutions (Tables 1-3) indicates that with the exception of the Cajas in Spain, one U.K. and one Irish case most other failures occurred at corporate banks. Gropp and Köhler (2010) report that cooperative and mutual banks suffered small, but savings banks much larger losses.
The empirical evidence on the role of institutional shareholders and blockholders is suggestive but not conclusive. In some cases, the results appear dubious. Like for boards, crude cross-country regressions are unlikely to provide reliable answers.
Pay for Performance
The leading theory of executive compensation was formalised most completely by Holmström and Tirole (1993) . The setting is a widely held corporations with weak shareholders who want to align the CEO's long-run objectives with their own. The model shows that this can be achieved by rewarding CEOs with stock. Jensen and Murphy (1990) had already shown empirically that the sensitivity of CEO pay to share price performance in the United States was low had been declining since the 1950s. On average, CEOs only participated with $3.25 in a $1000 change in shareholder value.
The idea of aligning CEO pay more closely with the stock price of a listed corporation is the one essential foundation behind executive compensation practice today. In this view it makes sense to focus on the stock price because under the efficient markets hypothesis it is an unbiased estimate of the fundamental value of the firm. Hence by making CEO compensation sensitive to the stock price shareholders induces managers to focus on long-term value. The stock price itself becomes a measure of CEO performance. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) look at the performance of biggest sample of about 95 bank holding companies and investment banks, from 2006 going forward through the crisis. In particular, they measure performance by buy-and-hold returns from July 1st, 2007 , to December 31st, 2008 . This performance measure is regressed on five different measures for CEO incentives: cash bonus and salary, dollar ownership, dollar equity risk sensitivity, percentage ownership and percentage risk sensitivity. If we think that compensation is one of the causes of the crisis, then we would expect to see that those bank CEOs whose incentives were less well-aligned with shareholders, would have bigger losses. So one would expect to see that the lower, say, the CEO's dollar ownership in a bank, the worse its performance.
In a key regression of the paper, however, Fahlenbrach and Stulz find the opposite: just focusing on dollar ownership, the coefficient obtained is significantly negative. This means that the more a bank CEO held in stock, the worse the performance of the bank going forward. They repeat the regression adding some controls, such as stock return level for 2006, book to market, log market value, and so on, but the coefficient remains negative. This leads Fahlenbrach and Stulz to conclude that based on their analysis, there is no evidence that CEO incentive misalignment caused worse performance. If anything, it is the opposite: it is greater alignment that caused worse performance.
Adding the controls to the regression does reveal a striking additional relationship, namely that book to market comes in with a negative coefficient. There is a suggestion in the paper that proposes a possible explanation for this finding: The better incentivised CEOs had stronger incentives to take risks.
The second aspect of short-term risk incentives that Fahlenbrach and Stulz focus on is that if managers were mismanaging the bank, they would have obviously known. They would have seen trouble coming and they would have, at the very least, tried to sell their stock, so as not to incur any losses. Their conclusions are, in that context, rather surprising. When they look at insider trading, reported trading of stock by bank CEOs, in their sample three-quarters of the CEOs did not sell any shares at all. So we might conclude they did not see any trouble coming, or at least they thought they were running their bank appropriately and they did not need to sell their stock. They compute how much the CEOs actually lost on this buy-and-hold strategy, that is on average close to $30 million, which is a substantial number.
Regarding the losses of the CEOs in the crisis, a somewhat different perspective is taken by Bebchuck, Cohen and Spamann (2009) . What they do is they look at Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers and they just look at how much the top executives made at Lehman and Bear Stearns. They come up with some really striking numbers: the top five executives at Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers made between $1.4 billion and $1 billion cumulatively in cash bonuses and equity sales before the firm's collapse.
What is really striking about these numbers, in our view, is that Bear Stearns is a firm that is about ten times smaller than Lehman, and yet its management walked away with much more in terms of compensation. Bebchuck, Cohen and Spamann conclude that a performance-based compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman did not result in an alignment of executive interest with long-term shareholder value. When the stock options vest there is an opportunity to sell the stock and this is what gives rise to short-term incentives. The executives are induced to pay attention to assuring that they can sell at a good price when the options vest, rather than to preserving the stock's value in the long term.
The most compelling study of the link between compensation structures in the financial services industry and risk taking is Cheng, Hong and Scheinkman (2010) . Did compensation structures in the financial industry create incentives towards excess risk taking? To address this question the authors study how residual executive compensation in the U.S. financial industry (that is, the compensation that cannot be explained by firm size and by industry factors) is related to measures of risk taken by the firm (as perceived by the market) and to performance. The authors find striking evidence of a positive correlation between the level of residual pay with the firm's beta and other measures of risk. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that executives were rewarded or encouraged to take excessive risks. The authors also find evidence of the fact that the executives who received the highest remuneration in the years leading up to the crisis were those in firms that performed the worst in the crisis. Chesney, Stromberg and Wagner (2010) confirm these findings by documenting a link between risk-taking incentives, independent boards and write-downs during the crisis. Tang and Wang (2011) show that high ratios of deferred compensation and pension payments to equity correlate with less risk taking.
Internal Control
Financial institutions are in the business of managing risk and one should imagine that risk control function is central to the corporate governance of such organisations. As we learnt during the financial crisis and the hearings that were conducted in its aftermath, risk control was inadequate in many cases. Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) formally investigate the potential link between risk control, risk taking and losses incurred at the largest listed U.S. bank holding companies (BHC). To measure the strength of risk management inside a BHC they construct three "Risk Management Indices" (RMI) that capture various combinations of ten observable characteristics of the risk management function: Does the bank have a Chief Risk Officer (CRO)? Is the CRO a senior executive? Is the CRO among the highest paid five executives? What is the ration of CRO to CEO pay? Do the outside directors on the risk committee have banking experience? How often does the risk committee meet? Is the meeting frequency above average? What is the percentage of outside directors with banking experience? Is the proportion above average? Does the relevant risk committee report directly to the board, and not just to the CEO?
There is a surprising degree of variation among the 70 largest listed bank holding companies in the United States. In only just over half the cases did the risk committee report directly to the board or was the CRO a senior executive. Only one out of five CROs was among the highest paid executives. Three quarters of CROs were paid less than 36% of the CEO. Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) find that the last measure, labelled "CRO centrality" is the dominant component when they related the RMI index to risk taking.
Banks with more risk controls before in 2006 took fewer risks and suffered fewer losses during the crisis. The results also hold from year-to-year over the whole period 2000-2008. They are robust to a number of control variables, like bank holding company size, CEO pay to performance sensitivity, institutional ownership and the absence of takeover defences. The carefully conducted empirical study confirms the anecdotal evidence that emerged from reports and hearings on individual cases.
Case study evidence points in the same direction. The Valukas (2010) report on the Lehman bankruptcy power states that senior management "disregarded its risk managers, its risk policies, and its risk limits" (Vol. 1, pg. 46). In 2007 the press reported that Lehman removed its Chief Risk Officer and the head of its fixed incomes division "because of their opposition to management's growing accumulation of risky and illiquid investments". In the U.K. a parliamentary investigation into the failure of HBOS alleged that its risk officer was made redundant for raising questions about the level and types of risk the bank was taking on. The former Chairman under examination declined to comment (BBC News 2009). The case study evidence leaves little doubt that failures in internal risk management were a major contributor to bank failures.
Reform Proposals
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999) are the standard reference for policy makers in developed economies. The publication of the Principles was triggered by the 1996 Russia/Asia/Brazil crisis and they are one of the twelve key standards for sound financial systems adopted by the Financial Stability Board. In parallel the Basel Committee on Banking Supervisors formulated specific recommendations for bank governance. The first Basel Principles were published in 1999 and significantly updated in 2006.
In both cases the Committee sought to complement the OECD Principles with what were believed to be specific governance requirements of banks. The Basel Committee also published a separate framework for internal control. In the previous section we discussed why these principles, frameworks and recommendations fell short: The 1999 version put too much emphasis on shareholders; the 2006 revision recognized the need to protect depositors and other creditors but came too late; well established principles, like those on internal control, were not sufficiently applied. The Basel Committee incorporated lessons from the crisis in a further update of the Principles (Basel Committee 2010).
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Reforming remuneration in banks is such a political priority that the G20 governments and the Financial Stability Board treat the subject separately. The FSB published Principles for Sound Compensation Practices and Implementation Standards in 2009. The FSB also conducted a peerreview of the implementation of the standards. The Basel Committee has been charged with developing an assessment methodology for prudential supervisors and to analyze the remuneration practices banks have put in place. The overarching theme is "risk-adjusted remuneration".
In parallel the United States, the European Commission and individual states conducted their own reviews of local bank failures and put forward laws and/or recommendations. These include the Dodd-Frank bill in the United States, the Walker Recommendations (2010) in the United Kingdom and the European Commission's Green Paper on the Corporate Governance of Financial Institutions (2010). Separate rules have been put in place for banks that received direct investment or aid from the relevant governments. We concentrate our discussion on the Basel Principles (2010) and the FSB (2009) remuneration standards, the main international reference documents.
The Basel Principles (2010) now state that bank governance is different: "from a banking perspective, corporate governance involves the allocation of authority and responsibilities [] including how they [..] protect the interests of depositors, meet shareholder obligations, and take into account the interests of other recognized stakeholders [supervisors, governments, bond holders]" (pg. 5). The Principles seek to protect these interests by broadening the duty of the board ("the board should take into account the legitimate interests of shareholders, depositors and other relevant stakeholders"; pg. 8) and assigning supervisors the role of monitors with the power to seek remedial action. The board is strengthened through the appointment of more competent directors and by reinforcing the risk management function, including an upgrade of the chief risk officer. The Principles are consistent with theory and the empirical evidence but they do not break with pre-crisis tradition: "the primary responsibility for good corporate governance rests with boards (supported by the control functions) and with senior management of banks" (pg. 33). Shareholder continue to appoint and remove the management or supervisory boards. 8 Will these boards really serve the interests of non-shareholder constituencies?
Remuneration policy reform is also in line with theory and the empirical evidence. The standards insist that remuneration in banks must be adjusted for risk. 9 The main difficulty is implementation.
The Basel (2011) analysis of remuneration methodologies applied by banks post-crisis illustrates the challenge. What is the appropriate performance benchmark? Banks are considering a range of internal and external, relative and absolute, quantitative and qualitative measures. What is the appropriate riskadjustment method? Many banks distinguish between quantitative and qualitative ex-ante and ex-post risk adjustment. Ex-ante adjustments take into account the risk of future adverse outcomes. Ex-post adjustments refer to observed outcomes. This can include "malus clauses" withhold all or part of deferred remuneration or "clawbacks" that claim back awards. How is the remuneration policy governed? Risk management and remuneration must be closely integrated and anchored appropriately at board level.
Numerous issues remain unsolved, in particular the incentives of senior management continue to be aligned more closely with shareholders than with other constituencies, in particular depositors and other creditors. The Basel Committee (2010) analysis indicates that shareholder returns remain a widely used performance benchmark. Vesting periods remain short (typically three years) and "long term" risk adjusted incentives continue to be awarded as equity. The administration of deferral and adjustment schemes is time consuming and costly. There are tax and legal issues.
Complexity, opacity and subjectivity in risk-adjustment is a major concern. Banks are being allowed to experiment with remuneration methodologies they believe are most suitable for their particular circumstances. This is appropriate in theory but puts a substantial assessment burden on supervisors.
In the absence of full public disclosure the heterogeneity of methods makes it almost impossible for interested outside parties, like creditors, analysts, credit rating agencies or academic researchers to assess the validity of the methodologies employed. The increasing range of remuneration practices will also provide opportunities for abuse. The tradeoff between simplicity and verifiability versus flexibility and complexity requires additional thought and study. 
Conclusion
8 Board members appointed by controlling shareholders "should have responsibilities to the bank itself, regardless who appoints them" (pg. 15). 9 The standards also recommend taking into account a broad range of risk, in particular credit, market, liquidity, operational, business legal and reputational risk. Liquidity risk had been vastly underestimated before the crisis. 10 There are worrying parallels with capital adequacy regulation. Basel I was simple rigid and imposed additional cost on some banks but difficult to game. Basel II was superior in theory but banks and supervisors failed in developing, applying and assessing the appropriate risk-weighting models; in some cases deliberately.
Financial regulation and policy has started to recognize that bank governance is different. Boards are supposed to have responsibilities to creditors as well as shareholders. Remuneration will be adjusted for risk. Internal control will be strengthened. These are positive developments supported by theory and the available evidence. The reforms do not go far enough. Creditors need a formal role in the corporate governance of banks, for example a seat on the board. The remuneration of executives must be aligned more simply and directly with debtholders, for example through convertible bonds. Investment banks might have to be forced back to the partnership model, with the decision makers putting up most of the equity capital.
The corporate governance of banks is interconnected with other areas of banking reform, such as deposit insurance and the authority of the deposit insurers, the power of regulators to intervene in internal control, the debate about complexity and scope, capital adequacy and capital structure. In each case due attention must be given to the impact reforms will have on the incentives of managers and boards. The crisis has shown that incentives matter. Without the right incentives for those running banks all other reform will fail. Source : Cheng, Hong and Scheinkman (2010) Equity €0 €10 €12
C. Prohibitively high debt: the firm cannot raise the capital
If the face value of the existing senior debt exceeds a further threshold (€115 in the example), there is not enough value in the good state to reward new investors for their capital injection: they need to receive at least €45 so that their expected payoff compensates them for the €36 that they invest. The bank is neither willing nor able to raise new capital.
As a final comment, there are several remedies for debt overhang. One possibility is to declare bankruptcy, and undergo a judicial procedure that recapitalizes the firm by converting all or part of its debt into equity; this process can be time-consuming and wasteful. **** MENTION CHAPTER 11 **** A second option is to renegotiate the terms of the debt with the existing creditors: they will benefit from the potential investment if it goes through, and should be willing to reduce the required repayment on their claim down so as to ensure that it does; equivalently, they can be asked to supply the new money. Such renegotiation is not always possible if creditors are widely dispersed. If the creditors include the government deposit insurance fund, the government should force the firm to raise new capital in case B., and if necessary (case C.) take control and inject new capital.
